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GIFT  OF 
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ORGANIZATION,  TRAINING,  AND  MOBILIZATION  OF 
A  RESERVE  FOR  THE  REGULAR  ARMY 


PREPARED  BY  THE  WAR  COLLEGE  DIVISION,  GENERAL  STAFF  CORPS 

AS   A   SUPPLEMENT    TO    THE    STATEMENT    OF    A   PROPER   MILITARY 

POLICY  FOR  THE  UNITED  STATES 


WCD  8106-15 


ARMY  WAR  COLLEGE  :  WASHINGTON 

NOVEMBER,  1915 


WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 
1916 


522 


.  >   A 

:  .  ' 


WAR  DEPARTMENT, 

Document  No.  522. 

Office  of  the  Chief  o 


SYNOPSIS. 


Page. 

1.  Principles  governing  brochure. .  ^ 5 

2.  Character  of  reserve  discussed 5 

3.  The  present  "Army  reserve  " 6 

4.  Regulations  for  "Army  reserve  " 6 

5.  Defects  of  present  law 7 

6.  Necessity  for  change  in  law 9 

7.  Development  of  reserve 10 

8.  Composition  of  each  unit,  Regular  Army 11 

9.  Period  with  the  colors  should  be  definite 11 

10.  Degree  of  readiness  of  regular  reserve 11 

11.  Organization  of  units 12 

12.  Mobile  troops  alone  required 12 

13.  Distribution  in  arms  of  the  service 13 

14.  Estimate  of  strength  after  three  years 13 

15.  Organization  under  department  commanders 14 

16.  Officers  for  regiments  and  smaller  unite 14 

17.  Officers  for  divisions  and  brigades 15 

18.  Arms  and  equipment 15 

19.  Annual  training  of  reserve 15 

20.  Elimination  of  the  unfit 15 

21.  Should  pay  be  given  for  service  in  reserve? 16 

22.  Pay  due  for  annual  training 16 

23.  Advantages  of  annual  assembly  of  reserve 17 

24.  Mobilization  of  reserve 17 

25.  Notice  of  mobilization 18 

26.  Transportation  and  subsistence  of  reservists 18 

27.  Record  of  assembly  and  physical  examination 18 

28.  Clothing  for  reservists 19 

29.  Advantages  of  policy  outlined 19 

622  (3) 


667379 


ORGANIZATION,   TRAINING,   AND   MOBILIZATION   OF   A 
RESERVE  FOR  THE  REGULAR  ARMY. 


[A  brochure  based  upon  and  explanatory  of  a  Statement  of  a  Proper  Military  Policy  for 
the  United  States,  Sept.  11,  1915.] 

1.  PRINCIPLES  GOVERNING  BROCHURE. 

A  Statement  of  a  Proper  Military  Policy  for  the  United  States, 
submitted  September  11,  1915,  contains  in  Chapter  III,  Reserves, 
the  following  paragraph: 

41.  The  regular  reserve. — As  the  United  States  should  have  a  mobile  force 
of  500,000  soldiers  available  at  home  at  the  outbreak  of  war,  the  Army,  with 
the  regular  reserve,  should  amount  to  this  strength.  In  order  to  develop  the 
necessary  regular  reserve  with  the  Army  at  the  strength  advocated  in  this 
policy,  enlistments  would  have  to  be  for  about  eight  years — two  with  the 
colors  and  six  in  reserve.  That  would,  in  eight  years,  result  in  approximately 
the  following  mobile  forces  at  home  available  at  the  outbreak  of  war : 

(1)  Mobile  regular  troops  (combatant)  with  the  colors 121,  000 

(2)  The  regular  reserve 379,000 

Total 500,  000 

During  the  first  weeks  of  war  in  this  country  the  military  situation  will 
probably  be  critical.  At  that  time  every  fully  trained  soldier  should  be  put 
in  the  field.  To  do  that  with  the  small  military  establishment  herein  advocated 
it  is  necessary  that  during  peace  the  Army  be  kept  at  war  strength  and  that 
the  regular  reserve  be  organized  and  not  kept  back  to  replace  losses  expected 
during  war.  Such  losses  should  be  replaced  from  depot  units. 

2.  CHARACTER  OF  RESERVE  DISCUSSED. 

Generally  speaking,  any  troops  not  incorporated  in  the  Regular 
Army,  but  intended  for  reenforcement  thereof,  constitute  a  reserve 
of  such  Army.  This  paper  deals  only  with  that  portion  of  such  a 
reserve  force  as  is  developed  through  the  ranks  of  the  Regular 
Army  and  is  intended  for  use  jointly  with  the  Regular  Army;  that 
which  consists  of  trained  and  organized  mobile  troops,  ready  for 
use  at  the  outbreak  of  war  under  conditions  stated  in  paragraph  6 
of  the  "  Statement  of  a  proper  military  policy." 

The  estimate  of  379,000  men  in  reserve,  stated  in  the  policy. 
(W.  C.  D.,  9053-90)  is  based  on  the  experience  that  while  serving 
with  the  colors,  about  20  per  cent  per  year  of  our  soldiers  are  lost 
otherwise  than  by  expiration  of  enlistment  (W.  C.  D.  9053-43),  and 
on  the  assumption  that  such  loss  while  men  are  furloughed  to  the 

522  (5) 


6 

reserve  will  be  at  about  half  this  rate  and  that  about  28  per  cent 
of  the  Army  will  be  enlisted  men  with  special  qualifications  needed 
continuously  with  the  colors.  The  strength  being  231,166  (omitting 
Philippine  Scouts  and  Porto  Rican  Regiment),  72  per  cent  thereof, 
or  166,500,  will  develop  approximately  379,000  reserves  at  the  end 
of  eight  years. 

3.  THE  PRESENT  "ARMY  RESERVE." 

It  is  well,  in  consideration  of  this  subject,  to  study  the  existing 
law  and  ascertain  whether  it  will  furnish  the  number  of  reservists 
required. 

Section  2  of  the  act  of  August  24,  1912  (37  Stat,  590,  591;  pp. 
36  and  37,  Bulletin  No.  15,  War  Department,  1912),  provided  for  the 
Army  reserve  consisting  of: 

(1)  Class  A. — Soldiers  furloughed  and  transferred  at  the  expira- 
tion of  three  years'  service  and  soldiers  furloughed  at  the  expira- 
tion of  four  years'  service,  unless  they  apply  to  remain  with  their 
organizations  until  completion  of  the  seven-years'  period  of  enlist- 
ment, made  effective  on  November  1,  1912,  by  the  act. 

(2)  Class  B. — Soldiers  who  reenlist  in  the  Army  reserve  for  a 
term  of  three  years  at  the  expiration  of  a  seven-years'  period  of 
enlistment,   and  persons  honorably   discharged   from   the   Regular 
Army  who  may  enlist  in  the  Army  reserve  for  a  term  of  three  years. 
No  restriction  is  placed  upon  reenlistment  of  any  soldier. 

The  same  act  provided  an  "  auxiliary  to  the  Army  reserve  "  con- 
sisting of  honorably  discharged  soldiers  of  the  Regular  Army  not 
over  45  years  of  age  with  character  reported  at  least  good,  who,  when 
called  by  proclamation  of  the  President  in  time  of  war  or  when  war 
is  imminent,  present  themselves  for  reenlistment  within  a  specified 
period  and  are  found  physically  qualified  for  the  duties  of  a  soldier. 

4.  REGULATIONS  FOR  "ARMY  RESERVE." 

Members  of  the  Army  reserve  not  in  active  service  are  not  entitled 
to  pay  or  allowances.  If  summoned  by  the  President  to  active  service 
when  so  authorized  by  Congress,  in  event  of  threatened  or  actual 
hostilities,  reservists  of  class  A  receive  during  continuance  of  their 
service  pay  and  allowances  authorized  by  law  for  soldiers  serving 
in  their  organizations  and  a  sum  equal  to  $5  per  month  for  each 
month  they  have  belonged  to  the  reserve,  as  well  as  actual  cost 
of  transportation  and  subsistence  from  their  homes  to  the  places 
at  which  they  may  be  ordered  to  report  for  duty.  They  revert  to 
the  grade  of  private  on  date  of  reporting  for  duty.  Reservists  of 
class  B  receive  the  same,  including  additional  pay  for  second  en- 
listment. 

Each  honorably  discharged  soldier  summoned  by  the  President 
as  part  of  the  "  auxiliary  to  the  Army  reserve "  found  physically 

522 


qualified  and  reenlisted  in  the  line  of  the  Army  or  Hospital  Corps 
receives  on  reenlisting  a  bounty  computed  at  rates  from  $8  to  $2 
per  month,  according  to  the  period  which  has  elapsed  since  his  last 
discharge,  and  not  to  exceed  $300  for  any  member  of  such  auxiliary. 

Doubtless,  because  of  language  employed  in  the  last  proviso  of 
section  2,  viz,  "may  summon  all  furloughed  soldiers  who  belong 
to  the  Army  reserve  to  rejoin  their  respective  organizations,"  and 
because  of  the  opinion  of  the  Judge  Advocate  General  of  the  Army, 
October  1, 1912  (pp.  34-39,  Bulletin  No.  22,  War  Department,  1912), 
the  Regulations  for  the  Army  Reserve,  General  Orders  No.  11,  War 
Department,  1913,  as  amended,  prescribe  that  the  records  of  class 
A  reservists  and  of  such  class  B  reservists  as  have  been  assigned 
to  organizations  be  kept  by  the  commanders  of  organizations  or 
chiefs  of  bureaus,  the  numbers  thereof  being  noted  on  monthly 
returns  and  the  names  on  December  muster  rolls,  or  reported  monthly 
by  number,  and  December  31  by  name  in  letters  to  The  Adjutant 
General. 

The  custodians  of  such  records  furnish  each  reservist  whose  record 
is  held  a  postal  card  once  each  quarter,  on  which  the  reservist 
reports  any  change  of  address  or  change  in  name  and  address  of 
nearest  relative.  This  represents  the  only  measure  by  which  the 
number  of  reservists  still  alive  may  be  estimated.  No  measure 
provides  verification  of  physical  condition  of  reservists. 

5.  DEFECTS  OF  PRESENT  LAW. 

This  law  is  defective  in  the  following  respects : 

(a)  It  will  not  develop  an  adequate  reserve.    On  May  8,  1915,  The 
Adjutant  General  submitted  an  estimate  of  the  approximate  num- 
ber of  men  who  under  this  law  will  be  furloughed  or  transferred  to 
the  Army  Reserve.    Basing  his  estimate  upon  the  percentage  of  men 
enlisted  or  reenlisted  who  did  not  from  1908  to  1914  reenlist  after 
completing  their  periods  of  enlistment,  he  reported  that  by  Novem- 
ber 1,  1919,  seven  years  after  the  seven-years'  period  became  effective, 
the  Army  Reserve  may  amount  to  25,624  enlisted  men,  the  number 
thereafter  furloughed  to  the  reserve  being  approximately  equal  to 
those  discharged  from  the  reserve.    He  reported  that  if  all  men  who 
did  not  intend  to  reenlist  be  furloughed  to  the  reserve  at  the  expira- 
tion of  three  years'  service  the  reserve  by  November  1,  1919,  may 
amount  to  34,000  men.    Even  if  no  casualties  occur  among  members 
of  the  reserve,  its  strength  will  never  be  sufficient  to  raise  units  from 
peace  to  war  strength  if  such  step  be  desirable.    The  Regular  Army, 
including  reserve,  will  never  exceed  134,000  men  under  this  law. 

(b)  No  reliable  estimate  can  be  made  of  the  number  of  reservists 
to  be  anticipated. 

522 


8 

The  estimate  given  in  (a)  is  confessedly  only  a  guess.  As  re- 
enlistment  is  not  limited,  and  men  have  the  option  of  serving  three, 
four,  or  seven  years  of  the  period  for  which  enlisted,  the  reserve  de- 
veloped, as  well  as  the  actual  strength  of  the  Army,  depends  upon 
the  business  conditions  of  the  country.  If  labor  commands  a  high 
price,  men  who  do  not  desert  will  seek  purchase  of  discharge  after 
one  year's  service  or  furlough  to  the  reserve  after  three  years'  service. 
If  times  are  hard  and  their  station  agreeable,  they  may  decide  to 
remain  seven  years  and  then  reenlist,  or  may  reenlist  at  expiration  of 
four  years  rather  than  pass  to  the  reserve.  Their  decision  may  be 
influenced  by  conditions  prevailing  at  their  stations  or  their  satisfac- 
tion or  dissatisfaction  with  their  commanders  or  associates. 

(<?)  The  law  by  providing  that  reservists  shall,  when  summoned, 
"rejoin  their  respective  organizations"  countenances  the  expensive 
and  inefficient  system  of  reduced  strength  of  units  in  peace. 

In  a  country  of  as  great  area  as  the  United  States  reservists  could 
not  always  or  usually  join  "their  respective  organizations"  in  time 
to  participate  in  employment  of  such  organizations  when  war  comes 
without  warning.  Even  if,  after  long  and  expensive  journeys,  these 
reservists  join  the  companies  from  which  furloughed,  they  would  not 
find  arms  and  equipment  on  hand  for  issue.  If  such  are  kept  always 
with  companies,  much  expense  for  transportation  will  result.  Officers 
for  a  company  of  Infantry  of  150  men  cost  no  more  than  for  a  com- 
pany of  65  men.  The  same  officers  can  command  and  administer 
150  men  in  war  efficiently  only  if  required  to  command  and  administer 
approximately  the  same  sized  organization  in  peace. 

(d)  Mobilization  must  be  delayed,  even  when  hostilities  are  actual, 
until  authority  can  be  obtained  from  Congress. 

If  Congress  be  not  in  session,  or  if,  being  in  session,  the  question 
be  debated,  the  transportation,  equipment,  and  training  of  the  Army 
Reserve  may  be  delayed  until  a  hostile  force  has  effected  a  landing 
or  crossed  our  international  border. 

(e)  Absence  of  any  authority  to  mobilize,  inspect,  or  train  re- 
servists, except  "  in  event  of  actual  or  threatened  hostilities "  and 
"  when  so  authorized  by  Congress,"  renders  uncertain  how  many 
reservists  may  be  relied  upon  and  "  found  physically  fit  for  service." 

Freed  from  the  restraints  of  discipline  and  separated  from  the 
sanitary  conditions  surrounding  them  when  with  the  colors,  fur- 
loughed soldiers  may  contract  vicious  habits  or  incurable  diseases, 
may  lose  eyesight,  hearing,  or  a  limb,  and  yet  be  borne  on  the  rolls 
of  "  their  respective  organizations  "  as  potential  soldiers  when  sum- 
moned. 

(/)  Payment  of  bounties  to  members  of  the  "  auxiliary  to  the 
Army  reserve"  and  of  sums  not  thus  called,  but  equivalent  to 
bounties  to  members  of  the  Army  reserve,  gives  legislative  sanction 

522 


9 

to  a  pernicious  system  of  purchasing  compliance  with  his  duty  by 
a  citizen  in  the  first  case  and  with  the  obligation  voluntarily  assumed 
by  a  soldier  in  the  second. 

Any  ex-soldier  whose  services  are  desirable  in  war  will  appear 
somewhere,  either  as  an  officer  or  enlisted  man  of  volunteers,  or  as 
an  enlisted  regular,  whether  or  not  it  be  possible  for  him  to  collect 
a  bounty  "  not  to  exceed  $300."  A  soldier  who  has  been  away  from 
the  colors  six  years  and  six  months  will  receive  the  total  of  $300, 
as  will  another  who,  having  been  discharged  at  21  (after  three 
years'  enlistment  under  former  laws),  offers  to  enlist  23  years  later, 
or  before  he  is  45.  Is  either  worth  more  than  a  young,  healthful 
college  graduate  with  four  years'  attendance  at  such  an  institution 
as  Cornell  and  two  or  three  summers  at  a  students'  camp?  No 
"  bounty  "  is  payable  to  the  latter. 

A  member  of  the  Army  reserve,  sworn  to  serve  seven  years,  but 
furloughed  during  the  latter  four,  may  be  paid  at  the  rate  of  $5 
per  month  for  the  entire  period  spent  in  the  Army  reserve.  No 
limit  of  $300  is  prescribed  in  determining  the  total  of  such  sums 
payable.  If  a  soldier  has  served  as  a  reservist  more  than  five  years 
in  various  enlistments,  he  receives  more  than  $300  (pp.  4  and  5, 
Bulletins  33,  War  Department,  1913).  Why  should  a  soldier  be  paid 
for  complying  with  his  oath  of  enlistment  ? 

Reports  of  The  Adjutant  General  show  that  about  61,033  ex-sol- 
diers who  left  the  service  from  June  30,  1910,  to  June  30,  1914,  are 
now  in  civil  life.  Should  the  President  call  upon  them  to  present 
themselves  for  reenlistment  under  this  Act  about  June  30,  1916, 
the  possible  bounties  payable,  ranging  from  $192  to  $300  (2  years  to 
6  years,  6  months  out  of  service),  amount  to  $15,000,000.  Other 
ex-soldiers,  discharged  fiscal  years  1891-1909,  inclusive,  amount  to 
83,000,  and  their  bounties  to  $25,000,000,  a  total  of  $40,000,000  for 
the  "  auxiliary  to  the  Army  reserve."  At  the  average  rate  of  annual 
pay  of  infantry  soldiers  in  a  peace  strength  company  ($213  about) 
this  sum,  offered  to  purchase  enlistment  of  83,000  men,  would  furnish 
more  than  the  pay  of  10  divisions  for  one  year.  If  the  possible 
Army  reserve  after  1919  be  estimated  at  34,000  men,  and  the  average 
period  of  each  of  these  in  the  reserve  be  considered  two  years  (half 
the  possible  period  in  reserve  during  one  enlistment),  return  of 
these  to  the  colors  would  cost  over  $4,000,000 — a  little  more  than  the 
pay  of  one  division  for  a  year. 

6.  NECESSITY  FOR  CHANGE  IN  LAW. 

As  this  legislation  represents  our  first  effort  to  provide  by  law 
for  a  reserve  of  the  Regular  Army,  it  is  not  surprising  that  the 
result  is  disappointing. 

30669°— No.  522—16 2 


10 

It  was  stated  in  the  Keport  of  the  Organization  of  the  Land 
Forces,  1912  (p.  31) : 

In  adopting  a  new  policy  in  our  Army  it  is  important  that  present  conditions 
should  not  be  disturbed  more  violently  than  necessary. 

*  *  *  The  important  thing  is  to  take  a  step  toward  the  new  policy,  leav- 
ing its  perfection  to  the  experience  of  the  future. 

After  the  experience  of  the  past  three  years  it  is  necessary  that 
we  so  change  the  legislation  governing  a  reserve  that  such  force  may 
be  developed  regardless  of  business  conditions,  developed  to  an  ex- 
tent sufficient  for  adequate  defense  and  capable  of  immediate  mobili- 
zation in  organized  units  composed  of  men  physically  fit  and  prop- 
erly armed  and  equipped  without  the  necessity  and  expense  of 
purchasing  compliance  with  military  obligations  by  payment  of 
bounties. 

7.  DEVELOPMENT  OF  RESERVE. 

If  the  country  can  afford  the  expense,  the  500,000  men  found  neces- 
sary for  immediate  use  against  trained  troops  of  a  possible  invader 
should  all  be  continuously  with  the  colors,  and  continued  reenlist- 
ment  of  every  desirable  soldier  should  be  encouraged.  The  profes- 
sional soldier  should  be  encouraged  to  remain  permanently  in  the 
ranks,  and  the  only  reserve  required  can  be  gradually  absorbed  from 
depot  units  as  casualties  occur  in  war. 

The  expense  for  the  Army  under  this  plan  would  be  prohibitive; 
but,  if  we  do  not  have  reserves,  we  are  committed  to  a  policy  of  maxi- 
mum cost. 

If  the  country  can  not  afford  to  adopt  a  system  involving  maximum 
cost,  it  is  equally  necessary  to  have  ready  for  immediate  mobiliza- 
tion a  force  equal  in  size  and  as  nearly  as  possible  equal  in  training. 

The  military  problem  is  not  affected  by  the  financial  ability  of  this 
country  to  meet  the  bill.  If  the  500,000  men  required  are  not  main- 
tained always  with  the  colors  they  should  at  least  have  served  with 
the  colors  in  the  ranks  of  the  Regular  Army  a  period  sufficient  to 
receive  training  that  will  render  each  member  continuously  efficient 
during  his  period  in  the  reserve.  This  period  is  fixed  at  two  years  in 
the  Statement  of  a  Proper  Military  Policy.  The  period  each  such 
trained  soldier  must  remain  in  the  reserve  depends  upon  the  relation 
of  the  strength  with  the  colors  to  the  total  force  required  and  the 
percentage  of  each  unit  which,  because  permitted  to  reenlist,  does  not 
contribute  toward  development  of  a  reserve.  In  this  policy  such 
period  is  six  years,  based  upon  figures  shown  in  paragraph  2  above. 

The  economic  effect  of  a  reserve  system  is  to  reduce  the  per  capita 
cost  of  an  army  of  the  size  demanded  by  the  military  situation. 
Economy  suggests  designation  of  a  large  fraction  of  the  500,000 
required  as  reserves.  Effective  action  in  emergency  limits  such 

522 


11 

expansion  of  the  reserve  portion  to  that  fraction  which  can  retain 
efficiency  and  jointly  with  the  peace  nucleus  satisfy  the  demands  of 
the  military  problem. 

The  provision  of  a  reserve  is  a  purely  business  proposition. 

8.  COMPOSITION  OF  EACH  UNIT,  REGULAR  ARMY. 

The  enlisted  strength  of  every  unit  of  the  Army  should  consist 
of  two  portions: 

(a)  A  permanent  personnel  composed  of  those  men  essential  to 
the  continued  discharge  by  such  unit  of  its  function  as  a  training 
school  for  reservists. 

(5)  A  temporary  personnel  composed  of  those  citizens  who  are 
passed  through  this  training  school  and  prepared  for  possible  serv- 
ice as  members  of  other  (reserve)  units  of  the  same  or  of  a  similar 
arm  of  the  service. 

9.  PERIOD  WITH  THE  COLORS  SHOULD  BE  DEFINITE. 

While  deserving  soldiers,  who  apply  and  are  recommended  by 
their  commanders  as  sufficiently  trained,  should  be  granted  furloughs 
to  the  reserve  after  a  period  of  less  than  two  years,  provided  the 
military  situation  warrants  the  grant  of  such  privilege,  it  must  not 
be  optional,  as  now,  for  a  soldier  to  remain  with  the  colors  longer 
than  two  years,  unless  he  be  a  noncommissioned  officer  or  a  man  of 
other  technical  training  essential  as  a  member  of  the  permanent  per- 
sonnel of  his  organization  for  the  training  of  other  soldiers  or  the 
administration  of  the  organization.  To  permit  soldiers  generally 
an  option  as  to  length  of  service  with  the  colors,  is  to  continue  the 
present  uncertainty  as  to  the  size  of  reserve  that  may  be  developed. 
The  privilege  of  discharge  by  purchase  should  be  repealed.  Not  to 
exceed  28  per  cent  of  each  unit  should  be  permitted  to  reenlist. 

No  soldier,  whether  with  the  colors  or  with  the  reserve,  should  be 
discharged  except  for  expiration  of  period  of  enlistment,  by  sentence 
of  court-martial,  or  for  physical  disability  or  other  unfitness  for 
military  service. 

10.  DEGREE  OF  READINESS  OF  REGULAR  RESERVE. 

Keserve  units  supplied  with  trained  personnel  should  not  be  con- 
fused with  the  force  of  citizen  soldiers  discussed  in  the  first  section 
of  paragraph  42  of  the  Statement  of  a  Proper  Military  Policy.  The 
latter  force  will  probably  not  have  received,  in  time  of  peace,  suffi- 
cient training  to  render  it  fit  for  immediate  employment  against  the 
enemy  at  the  outbreak  of  war,  but  the  reserve  of  the  Regular  Army 
must  be  ready  for  such  employment,  and  hence  its  members  must 

522 


12 

have  had  such  training  as  will  fit  it  for  immediate  service  jointly 
with  that  portion  of  the  Kegular  Army  serving  with  the  colors.  For 
the  same  reason  it  must  have  in  peace  such  organization  and  equip- 
ment as  will  render  possible  its  instantaneous  mobilization  and  trans- 
portation to  the  places  at  which  its  action  is  desirable  when  war 
becomes  imminent. 

11.  ORGANIZATION  OF  UNITS. 

Section  4  of  the  act  of  Congress  approved  April  25,  1914,  contains 
this  proviso: 

Provided  further,  That  when  military  conditions  so  require,  the  President 
may  organize  the  land  forces  of  the  United  States  into  brigades  and  divisions 
and  such  higher  units  as  he  may  deem  necessary,  and  the  composition  of  units 
higher  than  the  regiment  shall  be  as  he  may  prescribe. 

The  reserve  of  the  Army  being  a  part  of  the  Kegular  Army,  and 
therefore  of  the  "land  forces  of  the  United  States,"  according  to 
the  act  cited  above,  this  proviso  authorizes  the  organization  of 
reserve  units  higher  than  the  regiment  by  Executive  orders  of  the 
President.  Organization  of  other  units — regiments  and  lesser — has 
been  provided  by  various  acts  of  Congress.  Because  of  development 
of  armament  and  function  of  certain  branches  of  the  service,  this 
legislation  requires  changes.  The  organization  of  various  units  of 
the  Eegular  Army  reserve  should  be  the  same  as  the  organization 
of  similar  units  of  the  Regular  Army. 

12.  MOBILE  TROOPS  ALONE  REQUIRED. 

The  military  problem  requiring  a  force  of  500,000  men  available 
at  home  as  a  mobile  force,  that  portion  designated  as  a  regular 
reserve,  must  be  composed  of  mobile  troops. 

As  stated  in  paragraph  32  of  a  Statement  of  a  Proper  Military 
Policy,  all  mine  fields  and  over-sea  guns  and  one-half  the  guns  at 
home  are  manned  from  the  Regular  Army.  The  remainder  of  the 
guns  at  home  are  to  be  manned  by  Coast  Artillery  units  of  the 
Organized  Militia. 

This  arrangement  suggests  the  propriety  of  assigning  enlisted  men 
of  the  reserve  who  have  received  training  as  members  of  the  Coast 
Artillery  Corps  units  of  the  Regular  Army  to  reserve  units  of  Field 
Artillery.  This  is  especially  desirable,  as  the  quota  of  reservists 
developed  by  units  of  Field  Artillery  recommended  will  not  be 
sufficient  to  furnish  personnel  for  the  corps  or  field  army  artillery 
required  as  a  portion  of  the  mobile  artillery  of  the  reserve. 

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13.  DISTRIBUTION  IN  ARMS  OF  THE  SERVICE. 

Based  upon  the  enlisted  strength  of  various  units  of  the  Regular 
Army  shown  in  Tables  of  Organization,  1914,  the  379,000  enlisted 
members  of  the  reserve  would  furnish  mobile  reserve  units  approxi- 
mately as  follows: 


No. 

Units. 

Enlisted  strength. 

Combatant. 

Sanitary. 

Quarter- 
master 
Corps. 

Total. 

15 
3 
9 
3 
10 
5 
15 

5 

Divisions  Infantry  ................................. 

310,095 
26,931 
10,980 
3,297 
4.940 
815 
1,350 

12,390 
1,344 

6,315 
810 

328,800 
29,085 
10,980 
3,297 
4,940 
815 
1,350 

Divisions  Cavalry 

Regiments,  Heavy  Field  Artillery  

Regiments,  Mountain  Field  Artillery  

Ponton  battalions,  Engineers  

Field  battalions,  Signal  Corps  

358,  408 

13,  734 

7,125 

379,287 

No  sanitary  nor  supply  units  for  corps  or  field  army  troops  nor 
line  of  communications  troops  need  be  organized  in  this  reserve. 
Sufficient  sanitary  and  supply  units  as  composite  parts  of  divisions 
are  shown  above  for  units  which  may  anticipate  contact  with  the 
enemy.  Such  troops  for  corps  or  field  army  troops  and  all  troops 
for  the  line  of  communications  may  be  supplied  by  citizen  soldiers 
not  necessarily  possessing  so  great  a  degree  of  training. 

14.  ESTIMATE  OF  STRENGTH  AFTER  THREE  YEARS. 

Upon  the  adoption  of  a  policy  such  as  is  recommended,  the  mem- 
bers of  the  present  Army  reserve  and  such  men  as  have  enlisted 
under  the  present  law  will,  as  furloughs  become  due,  constitute  the 
only  reservists  until  two  years  from  the  date  the  new  law  becomes 
effective.  As  seen  in  the  discussion  of  the  act  of  August  24,  1912, 
the  size  of  the  reserve  during  such  period  will  not  until  November 
1,  1919,  exceed  34,000,  if  men  generally  are  furloughed  at  expira- 
tion of  three  years'  service,  or  25,000  if  furloughed  generally  at  the 
expiration  of  four  years'  service. 

If  legislation  pursuant  to  this  policy  be  adopted  so  as  to  give 
effect  thereto  July  1,  1916,  the  Army  reserve  should  by  July  1,  1918, 
equal  about  20,000  men.  By  July  1,  1919,  the  increment  received 
by  the  reserve  under  the  new  law  should  be  112,000  (86  per  cent  of 
131,000,  the  added  strength  of  the  Kegular  Army),  which,  with  what 
then  remains  of  the  "Army  reserve,"  should  furnish  a  reserve  of 
about  135,000  men. 

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14 

15.  ORGANIZATION  UNDER  DEPARTMENT  COMMANDERS. 

Until  such  time  members  of  the  reserve,  being  dispersed  by  resi- 
dence throughout  the  country  and  being  comparatively  small  in 
number,  could  not  well  be  organized  into  units  larger  than  com- 
panies, troops,  batteries,  etc.  Records  of  reservists  should  be  kept 
at  each  department  headquarters  until  administrative  units  (regi- 
ments, separate  battalions,  etc.)  can  be  organized.  A  soldier  fur- 
loughed  to  the  reserve  should,  on  designation  of  the  place  of  his 
intended  residence,  be  directed  to  report  (on  blank  form  prepared 
for  him  by  his  organization  commander)  to  the  department  com- 
mander or  administrative  unit  commander  of  his  branch  of  the 
service  for  the  area  including  his  selected  place  of  residence.  Regu- 
lations governing  his  duties  and  rights  should  be  given  him  for  his 
guidance.  Subsequent  instructions  should  be  sent  to  him,  at  the 
address  reported  by  him,  from  department  headquarters  or  from 
the  headquarters  of  the  administrative  unit  to  which  he  may  be 
assigned.  An  officer  of  the  General  Staff,  under  direction  of  the 
department  commander,  should  have  charge  of  assignment  of  all 
furloughed  soldiers  coming  within  the  department  until  adminis- 
trative units  shall  have  been  organized.  Thereafter  the  same  officer 
should  care  for  correspondence  concerning  assignment  of  personnel 
to  and  supply  and  mobilization  of  administrative  units  organized 
within  the  department. 

16.  OFFICERS  FOR  REGIMENTS  AND  SMALLER  UNITS. 

No  officers  for  this  reserve  of  higher  grade  than  captain  need  be 
appointed  or  assigned  until  the  numerical  strength  of  the  reserve  of 
any  branch  of  the  service  residing  within  a  definite  area  is  sufficient 
to  warrant  organization  of  units  larger  than  companies,  troops, 
batteries,  etc. 

The  supply  of  officers  for  the  reserve  is  the  subject  of  another 
brochure. 

An  excellent  source  of  supply  of  company  officers  during  the  early 
stages  of  this  organization  will  be  found  among  retired  noncommis- 
sioned officers  and  ex-noncommissioned  officers  of  the  Regular  Army 
living  now  at  various  places  throughout  the  country.  These  should 
all  be  given  opportunity  to  compete  by  examination  for  appointment 
to  the  grades  of  company  officers.  Field  officers  for  the  reserve 
should  be  selected  after  examination  from  among  retired  officers  and 
ex-officers  of  the  Regular  Army  living  within  the  proper  departments 
'of  administrative  unit  areas. 

522 


15 

17.  OFFICERS  FOR  DIVISIONS  AND  BRIGADES. 

Divisions  and  brigades  when  organized  should  be  commanded  by 
officers  of  the  Regular  Army,  detailed  in  peace  for  such  duty,  ap- 
pointments as  general  officers  becoming  effective  only  on  mobiliza- 
tion because  of  actual  or  threatened  hostilities. 

Such  appointments  should  create  temporary  vacancies  in  the 
grades  held  by  such  appointees,  to  be  filled  in  a  manner  provided  for 
similar  temporary  vacancies  caused  by  appointments  to  higher  vol- 
unteer rank  under  section  8  of  the  act  approved  April  25,  1914. 

18.  ARMS  AND  EQUIPMENT. 

Deposits  of  arms  and  equipment  for  this  reserve  should  be  placed 
in  storage  at  Army  posts,  in  Government  buildings,  and  at  rifle 
ranges  of  the  Organized  Militia.  Where  such  facilities  are  not 
available,  at  storehouses  erected  for  the  purpose. 

At  each  such  location  an  officer  of  the  reserve,  placed  on  active 
duty  throughout  the  year,  should  be  custodian  of  and  accountable 
for  the  arms  and  equipment. 

Sites  for  these  deposits,  as  they  are  to  become  mobilization  points 
for  the  reserve,  should  be  places  from  which  railway  communication 
facilitates  prompt  dispatch  of  mobilized  units  toward  camps  of  con- 
centration or  mobilization. 

19.  ANNUAL  TRAINING  OF  RESERVE. 

While  every  enlisted  member  of  the  reserve  will  have  had  training 
sufficient  to  establish  his  efficiency  before  furlough  to  the  reserve, 
maintenance  of  that  degree  of  efficiency  and  demonstration  that  he 
is  still  physically  and  morally  fit  for  service  suggest  the  propriety 
of  an  annual  period  of  inspection  and  training. 

In  the  report  of  the  Organization  of  the  Land  Forces,  1912,  the 
period  recommended  for  such  training  was  10  days  each  year. 

Without  this  opportunity  to  determine  the  physical  and  moral 
state  of  each  reservist  and  his  dependability  as  a  possible  soldier  in 
war,  the  country  may  find,  when  actual  or  threatened  hostilities 
cause  mobilization  of  the  reserve,  that  its  personnel  is  not  dependable 
to  the  extent  shown  by  records  of  its  strength. 

20.  ELIMINATION  OF  THE  UNFIT. 

Until  mobilization  places  or  camps  can  be  designated  for  assembly 
of  units  as  large  as  regiments,  the  reserve  should  have  its  training  at 
the  nearest  Army  stations.  Until  units  as  large  as  companies,  troops, 
and  batteries  are  organized,  individual  reservists  joining  at  the 
nearest  Army  stations  should  be  attached  to  regular  organizations 

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of  the  arm  of  service  appropriate.  During  the  assembly  for  training 
each  reservist  should  be  physically  examined  and  his  conduct  and 
habits  observed  closely.  If  he  should  have  developed  disease  such 
as  to  render  him  probably  unfit  for  service  in  war,  or  if  his  character 
be  such  as  to  render  him  undesirable  as  a  soldier,  he  should  be  dis- 
charged. Having  been  examined  physically  at  the  time  of  furlough 
to  the  reserve,  no  right  to  pension  for  disability  incurred  during 
such  status  of  furlough  should  be  recognized. 

For  failure  to  comply  with  orders  to  report  for  training,  a  reservist 
can  be  tried  and  punished,  if  arrested.  Whether  such  disciplinary 
action  should  be  undertaken  or  the  delinquent  discharged  for  the  con- 
venience of  the  Government  is  a  question  that  can  be  best  determined 
after  experience  with  a  reserve  system.  The  controlling  policy 
should  be  to  count  upon  no  strength  of  the  reserve  that  is  not  depend- 
able in  case  of  war. 

21.  SHOULD  PAY  BE  GIVEN  FOR  SERVICE  IN  RESERVE? 

A  wise  means  of  insuring  presence  of  reservists  at  the  annual 
training  is  to  postpone  the  delivery  to  him  of  any  payment  author- 
ized until  he  has  appeared  at  the  designated  assembly  point  and 
completed  the  training  prescribed.  This  leads  to  the  question  of 
remuneration  for  service  while  on  furlough  as  a  member  of  the 
reserve. 

Under  a  system  of  compulsory  service  no  pay  is  necessary  or  wise. 
The  furloughed  soldier  is  a  citizen  and  his  annual  training  is  a 
compliance  with  the  law  which  specifies  the  duties  demanded  of  him 
in  return  for  rights  and  privileges  enjoyed. 

Under  a  system  of  voluntary  enlistment,  some  pay,  monthly  or 
annual,  may  be  necessary,  or  citizens  will  not  enlist  in  sufficient 
numbers  to  enable  the  troops  with  the  colors  to  develop  sufficient 
reserves.  Whatever  be  the  amount  found  necessary  and  desirable, 
payment  thereof  is  for  having  been  ready  and  dependable  as  a  re- 
servist for  the  time  for  which  payment  is  to  be  made.  To  pay  by 
mail  on  mere  report  by  the  reservist  that  he  is  alive  and  residing  at 
his  proper  address  is  to  pay  possibly  for  one  who  would  not  be 
acceptable  as  a  soldier  if  called  to  the  colors. 

22.  PAY  DUE  FOR  ANNUAL  TRAINING. 

Full  pay  of  grade  held  on  furlough,  for  the  period  spent  in  train- 
ing, and  traveling  allowances  to  place  of  assembly  and  return  to  his 
home  should  be  paid  whether  any  reserve  pay  be  authorized  or  not. 

Men  furloughed  as  noncommissioned  officers  should  hold  such 
grades  during  training,  subject  to  reduction  if  their  conduct  or  lack 
of  efficiency  warrant. 

622 


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When  the  training  is  to  be  had  at  a  point  distant  from  the  assembly 
point  or  deposit  of  arms  and  equipment,  transportation  should  be 
by  organization. 

Transportation  from  homes  to  the  assembly  points  should  be  issued 
by  the  reserve  officers  on  active  duty  at  assembly  point,  or  by  any  post- 
master to  whom  transportation  requests  can  be  issued  as  an  acting 
quartermaster.  Subsistence  for  individuals  should  be  provided  by 
reimbursement  at  reasonable  rate  per  meal  instead  of  by  advance  of 
funds. 

23.  ADVANTAGES  OF  ANNUAL  ASSEMBLY  RESERVE. 

The  character  of  training  deemed  necessary  will  be  demonstrated 
only  by  experience. 
The  main  purposes  of  assembly  for  training  will  be : 

(1)  Opportunity  of  reserve  officers  to  acquire  some  knowledge  of 
their  subordinates ; 

(2)  Opportunity  to  eliminate  the  undesirable  and  promote  the 
efficient ; 

(3)  Opportunity  to  insure  continued  acquaintance  of  men  with 
arms  and  equipment,  the  models  of  which  may  have  changed  during 
their  furloughs ; 

(4)  Opportunity  through  joint  maneuvers  with  the  troops  with 
the  colors  to  preserve  acquaintance  with  modern  and  possibly  chang- 
ing methods  of  tactical  training ;  and 

(5)  Opportunity  to  verify  the  number  and  inspect  the  condition  of 
men  shown  by  the  returns  to  belong  to  the  reserve. 

Any  one  of  these  purposes  should  prove  sufficient  warrant  for  the 
expense  incurred  through  such  periodical  opportunity  to  make  an 
inventory  of  our  reserve  and  determine  its  value  as  a  military  asset. 

24.  MOBILIZATION  OF  RESERVE. 

The  mobilization  of  a  reserve  should  be  subject  to  orders  of  the 
President.  Solution  of  our  military  problem  demands  that  the  re- 
serve be  as  ready  for  prompt  action  as  troops  with  the  colors.  It 
will  not  be  as  near  the  scene  of  its  intended  action,  but  no  delay  in 
calling  its  members  to  the  colors  should  result  through  necessity,  as 
under  the  present  law,  of  waiting  for  authority  of  Congress. 

Having  been  directed  by  the  President,  mobilization  should  pro- 
ceed under  control  by  department  commanders. 

Units  having  assembled  at  the  points  previously  designated  and 
used  for  deposit  of  arms  and  equipment  for  each  annual  training 
should  be  moved  by  department  commanders,  according  to  instruc- 
tions received  by  them,  either  to  designated  points  in  the  theater  of 

522 


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operations  or  to  mobilization  or  concentration  camps.  Whether 
organizations  should  be  held  in  the  areas  pertaining  thereto  for  de- 
livery of  animals  and  motor  or  wagon  transportation  or  should  be 
sent  to  camps  of  mobilization  and  there  supplied  with  transportation 
of  this  kind  will  depend  upon  the  military  situation.  Usually  the 
latter  course  will  be  preferable,  as  wagons,  harness,  etc.,  from  gen- 
eral supply  depots  and  animals  purchased  or  requisitioned  may  be 
more  economically  and  promptly  delivered  to  organizations  at  camps 
of  mobilization. 

25.  NOTICE  OF  MOBILIZATION. 

Notice  of  orders  for  mobilization,  however  received,  should  charge 
each  officer  and  man  of  the  reserve  with  the  duty  of  reporting  at  the 
place  where  arms  and  equipment  are  deposited  for  his  organization. 
A  proper  way  of  serving  such  notice  would  be  by  posting  a  copy  of 
the  proclamation  of  the  President  at  every  post  office,  railroad  station, 
and  telegraph  office  in  the  country.  This  duty  could  be  assigned  to 
postmasters.  In  addition,  written  notice  should  be  mailed  by  the 
reserve  officers  on  active  duty  at  all  the  assembly  points  at  which  arms 
and  equipment  are  deposited  to  each  member  of  the  organization  re- 
quired to  assemble  at  such  points.  These,  in  blank  forms,  should  be 
addressed  in  time  of  peace,  only  the  date  of  mobilization  being  entered 
before  mailing.  Addresses  should  be  changed  as  residences  change. 

26.  TRANSPORTATION  AND  SUBSISTENCE  OF  RESERVISTS. 

Postmasters,  designated  as  acting  quartermasters,  should  be  given 
blank  transportation  requests  with  which  to  furnish  reservists  trans- 
portation to  places  of  assembly.  After  the  reserve  has  been  de- 
veloped to  the  strength  above  shown  possible,  places  of  assembly  will 
be  so  numerous  and  well  distributed  that,  except  in  the  case  of  mem- 
bers of  Signal  Corps,  engineers,  and  possibly  certain  field  artillery 
organizations,  no  reservist  need  travel  more  than  a  few  hours  in 
order  to  join.  Reimbursement  for  expense  of  meals  en  route,  at  a 
rate  of  25  cents  per  meal,  should  be  made  after  reporting  at  the 
assembly  point.  Officers  joining,  on  mobilization,  should  receive 
mileage  from  homes  to  places  designated  for  commencement  of  their 
duties. 

.      27.  RECORD  OF  ASSEMBLY  AND  PHYSICAL  EXAMINATION. 

No  muster  will  be  necessary.  Organization  rolls  should  be  kept 
up  to  date  in  peace  so  that  notation  on  such  rolls  of  the  date  each 
reservist  joins  need  be  the  only  official  record  of  the  date  when  his 
service  under  mobilization  is  commenced.  Physical  examination  by 
a  surgeon  of  the  reserve  should  be  made  as  soon  as  practicable  after 

522 


19 

joining  to  determine  whether  his  condition  warrants  service  either 
(1)  with  his  organization  or  (2)  in  some  less  active  status  with  the 
line  of  communications  troops  or  at  a  regimental  depot.  In  some 
cases  physical  disability  for  any  use  in  war  may  warrant  discharge. 
No  soldier  should  be  forwarded  with  his  organization  who  is  not 
physically  fit  for  service  in  the  field  and  free  from  communicable 
disease. 

28.  CLOTHING  FOR  RESERVISTS. 

Whether  each  member  of  the  reserve  be  required  to  keep  himself 
supplied  in  peace  with  one  serviceable  service  uniform,  to  be  worn 
to  place  of  assembly  on  mobilization,  or  the  clothing  for  each  organi- 
zation be  deposited  with  arms  and  equipment  and  issued  for  each 
training  period  and  on  mobilization,  can  be  determined  only  by  ex- 
perience. As  a  soldier's  title  to  his  clothing  is  shared  by  the  Gov- 
ernment until  discharge,  it  is  legal  and  equitable  to  require  him  to 
keep  some  service  uniform  during  his  period  of  furlough  and  to  use 
it  at  each  annual  assembly  for  training  and  on  mobilization. 

On  the  other  hand,  a  furloughed  soldier  might  wear  this  uniform 
when  not  called  for  training  or  mobilization,  and  many  would  not 
have  serviceable  clothing  when  such  is  needed. 

An  organization  will  be  more  uniformly  and  serviceably  clothed 
if  the  latter  plan  be  finally  adopted,  but  its  adoption  will  increase 
considerably  the  expense  of  maintaining  the  reserve. 

29.  ADVANTAGES  OF  POLICY  OUTLINED. 

The  policy  recommended  will  develop  a  reserve.  Its  strength  can 
be  definitely  estimated.  Its  efficient  employment  with  the  regular 
troops  with  the  colors  whenever  circumstances  warrant  mobilization 
can  be  reasonably  anticipated.  Its  adoption  will  reduce  the  per 
capita  cost  of  the  force  demanded  for  solution  of  the  national  mili- 
tary problem. 

While  more  than  human  foresight  is  required  to  frame  legislation 
for  which  subsequent  experience  may  not  suggest  the  propriety  of 
amendment,  the  reasons  just  cited  justiiy  adoption  of  legislation 
giving  sanction  to  the  policy. 

522 

o 


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